Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
Volume 21

Issue 1

Article 5

5-27-2020

The Indiscretion of Friends: Fourth Amendment Concerns About
the Ability to Predict a Person’s Online Social Activity by
Monitoring Her Contacts
George M. Dery III

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourth Amendment
Commons, and the Internet Law Commons

Recommended Citation
George M. Dery III, The Indiscretion of Friends: Fourth Amendment Concerns About the Ability to Predict a
Person’s Online Social Activity by Monitoring Her Contacts, 21 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 137 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol21/iss1/5

The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

The Indiscretion of Friends: Fourth
Amendment Concerns About the Ability to
Predict a Person’s Online Social Activity
by Monitoring Her Contacts
George M. Dery III*
ABSTRACT:
This Article considers new predictive surveillance technology
that could enable social media companies, as well as law
enforcement agencies, to predict a person’s future behavior based
solely on an examination of the person’s contacts. Employing the
tools of information theory, scientists at the University of
Vermont and the University of Adelaide have been able to predict
Twitter users’ future behavior by scrutinizing only the responses
of their contacts. This technological advance, which can be
applied to other kinds of social media, raises the prospect of law
enforcement gaining insight into the future behavior of social
media users even if such targets choose to withdraw from social
media. This Article analyzes the strength of potential arguments
for Fourth Amendment protection against this possibility. If
subjects of predictive surveillance argue that communications
with their contacts should be off limits to law enforcement,
precedent regarding disclosures by confidants to police indicates
these contentions will likely fail. However, the “target” theory of
standing, previously rejected by the Supreme Court, might allow
claims of Fourth Amendment violations in the unique context of
predictive surveillance. Finally, the strongest argument for
protection against government scrutiny of contacts to predict a
person’s future social media behavior would combine the Fourth
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INTRODUCTION

Have you grown weary of the privacy invasions of social
media? Perhaps you were appalled by Facebook’s collection of
“sensitive personal information about sexual orientation, race,
gender, even intelligence and childhood trauma” from some of its
users.1 Maybe you were alarmed by the proposed $5.3 million
settlement by such Internet giants as Instagram, Twitter, and
Yelp regarding a privacy lawsuit.2 After such revelations, the
prudent course might be to simply opt out of social media. The
loss of connections, updates, and entertainment, however
isolating, would be the necessary cost of preserving your privacy.
While such a decision might be wise and even laudable, it would
also come too late.
Researchers from the University of Vermont and the
University of Adelaide report that limiting the use of social
media and even completely deleting accounts provide “no
guarantee of privacy.”3 Employing “tools from information
theory,” James P. Bagrow, Xipei Liu, and Lewis Mitchell were
able to “repeatedly and accurately predict the text” of Twitter
users by focusing only on the “social ties” of a user, rather than
accessing the user’s own data.4 Essentially, these computer
scientists have demonstrated that “the Twitter streams of your
[ten] closest contacts can predict your future tweets even better
than your own stream.”5 Further, even though this particular
research focused on Twitter, Bagrow warned, “the same
information could be gathered from posts on other social media,

1. Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, How Cambridge
Analytica Turned Facebook ‘Likes’ into A Lucrative Political Tool, THE
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
17,
2018,
9:02
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/17/facebook-cambridge
-analytica-kogan-data-algorithm.
2. Jeff J. Roberts, Instagram, Twitter, and Others Could Pay Users $5.3
Million in App Privacy Settlement, FORTUNE (Apr. 4, 2017, 10:53 PM),
http://fortune.com/2017/04/04/find-friends-privacy-instagram-twitter/.
3. Matthew Hutson, People Can Predict Your Tweets—Even If You Aren’t
on
Twitter,
SCI.
(Jan.
21,
2019,
11:00
AM),
https://
www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/01/people-can-predict-your-tweets-even-ifyou-aren-t-twitter.
4. James P. Bagrow, Xipei Liu & Lewis Mitchell, Information Flow
Reveals Prediction Limits in Online Social Activity, 3 NATURE HUM. BEHAV.
122, 126 (2019).
5. Hutson, supra note 3.
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like Facebook.”6 Bagrow’s coauthor, Lewis Mitchell, simply said,
“There’s no place to hide in a social network.”7
The prospect of social media companies or law enforcement
being able to build predictive profiles based solely on one’s
contacts has troubling Fourth Amendment implications.8 Can
any person reasonably expect privacy when using social media,
or even after leaving such platforms, when “a person’s choices
and identity are embedded” in these social media services?9
Must Fourth Amendment protection be simply abandoned as
part of the price of functioning in a “highly networked
society[?]”10
This Article reviews Supreme Court precedent to consider
arguments that the Fourth Amendment protects against
predictive surveillance by law enforcement of social media
contacts in order to divine the future behavior of a user or former
user. The prior case law indicates that while some contentions
will not convince the Court, others could present a path to
Fourth Amendment protection for those using social media. This
Article begins, in Part II, with a review of the Court’s definition
of a Fourth Amendment “search.” Part III provides an
examination of the technology behind predictive surveillance.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the strength of the potential
arguments advocating for Fourth Amendment protection from
this new technology. If those subject to predictive surveillance
argue that their communications with friends and other contacts
should be off-limits to law enforcement, precedent regarding
disclosures by friends to police would indicate these contentions
likely fail. However, the “target” theory of standing, previously
rejected by the Court, might allow claims of Fourth Amendment

6. Umberto Bacchi, ‘No Place to Hide’: Twitter Contacts Give Your
Preferences Away, Study Finds, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2019, 6:59
PM), http://news.trust.org/item/20190121185119-yg73i/.
7. Id.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
9. Joshua E. Brown, Study: On Facebook and Twitter Your Privacy Is at
Risk—Even If You Don’t Have an Account, UVM TODAY (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.uvm.edu/uvmnews/news/study-facebook-and-twitter-your
-privacy-risk-even-if-you-dont-have-account.
10. Id.
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violations in the unique context of predictive surveillance.
Finally, the strongest argument might combine the Fourth
Amendment rights of a homeowner with recent Court rulings
extending privacy protection to digital information.
II. DEFINING A FOURTH AMENDMENT “SEARCH”
As with any law, the Fourth Amendment can only be
violated if it applies in the first place. By its own terms, the
Fourth Amendment applies only to “searches and seizures.”11
The Court provided a definition of a Fourth Amendment “search”
in Katz v. United States, a case in which federal agents placed
“an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the
public telephone booth” from which Katz placed a phone call. 12
This electronic device enabled the government to collect Katz’s
side of a conversation in which he illegally transmitted
“wagering information” in violation of federal law.13 The Court
ruled that the agents’ “activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth” and
therefore amounted to a Fourth Amendment “search.”14
Katz supported its conclusion with ringing language,
declaring that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”15 The Court proclaimed, “Wherever a man may be, he is
entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.”16 Recognizing “the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private communication,”
Katz concluded that anyone who occupies a phone booth “shuts
the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place
a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into
the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”17
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). But see United States
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (recognizing when the government
“physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining information”
as a second definition of a Fourth Amendment search). Since the technology
analyzed in this article will not necessitate such a physical trespass, Jones’
definition is beyond the scope of this article. Further, analysis of Fourth
Amendment “seizures” is also beyond the scope of this article.
13. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
14. Id. at 353.
15. Id. at 351.
16. Id. at 359.
17. Id. at 352.
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The Katz court spoke in such broad strokes that it provided
few specifics for a workable rule. Justice Harlan, in his
concurrence, wrote separately to address this problem. He noted:
“As the Court’s opinion states, ‘the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.’”18 The Court’s declaration, however, left
unanswered “what protection” the Fourth amendment “affords
to those people.”19 Justice Harlan proposed the following
clarifying guidance: “My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”20 For example, “a man’s home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy.”21 In contrast,
“conversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the
circumstances would be unreasonable.”22 Following Justice
Harlan’s formulation, the “Court uniformly has held that the
application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the
person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a
‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been
invaded by government action.”23 Indeed, the Court would come
to label Katz’s definition of a Fourth Amendment search as its
“touchstone.”24
III. PREDICTING A PERSON’S ACTIVITY SIMPLY BY
STUDYING HER SOCIAL MEDIA CONTACTS
Bagrow, Liu, and Mitchell considered the feasibility of
predicting a Twitter user’s future communications by analyzing
her closest contacts’ tweets.25 They began their “second-hand
surveillance”26 of people’s online behavior by randomly sampling

18. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
24. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
25. See generally Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, supra note 4 at 122 (using
“information theoretic tools to estimate the predictive information in the
writings of Twitter users”).
26. Hutson, supra note 3.
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Twitter during April 2014.27 The researchers sampled 927
Twitter users who tweeted in English, had been active for “at
least a [one]-year period[,]” and who had “50 [to] 500 followers.”28
The cutoff of those accounts below fifty followers avoided
“inactive and bot accounts” while the cutoff above 500 followers
steered clear of “unusually popular” outliers “such as celebrity
accounts.”29 The scientists collected all of the “public postings,”
excluding retweets, of their 927 users, whom they labeled as
“egos.”30 An examination of these tweets enabled the researchers
to identify their 927 egos’ top fifteen Twitter followers.31 The
researchers, deeming these 13,905 followers as “alters,”
gathered their tweets as well.32
The researchers aimed to predict the written text of their
927 egos, noting that “[r]epeated, accurate predictions of future
words indicate that the available information can be used to
build profiles and predictive models of a user.”33 In estimating
“how predictable a person’s future words would be,” the
researchers used “a measurement known as entropy.”34 Entropy
can limit predictability because “more entropy means more
randomness and less repetition.”35 To put the Twitter users’
entropy rates in context, the researchers measured the entropy
rates of writing in “formal text,” such as that of Ernest
Hemingway and James Joyce.36 “On [a]verage,” the 927 Twitter
users “had more entropy than Ernest Hemingway” and “less

27. Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 126.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 122.
31. See id. (“Each of the n=927 ego-networks consisted of one user (the ego)
and their [fifteen] most frequently mentioned Twitter contacts
(the alters) . . . .”).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 123. The study’s authors explain that “[t]he ability . . . to
accurately profile [and predict] individuals . . . is reflected in the predictability
of their written text.”). Id at 126.
34. Hutson, supra note 3.
35. Id.
36. Id. The scientists measured Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls and
Joyce’s Ulysses. They also measured the entropy rates of Thomas Pynchon’s
Gravity’s Rainbow and J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Fellowship of the Ring. James P.
Bagrow, Xipei Liu, & Lewis Mitchell, Supplementary Information for
“Information Flow Reveals Prediction Limits in Online Social Activity” at
Supplementary Table 1, https://bagrow.com/pdf/information-flow-reveals
-bagrow-2019_supp.pdf.
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than James Joyce.”37 The study’s authors then combined the
entropy measurement with “a tool from information theory
called Fano’s inequality” to “calculate how well a person’s stream
could predict the first word in his or her next tweet.” 38 In
considering the user/ego’s tweets, the upper boundary on
accuracy “for predicting a given word out of (approximately)
5000 possible words on average” was about fifty-three percent
which the researchers deemed “quite high.”39
The researchers then assessed the predictability of a user’s
next word when considering both the user/ego’s Twitter stream
and the streams of the user’s fifteen closest contacts/alters.40 The
predictability when considering both the user and her contacts
rose to sixty percent.41 When the user’s stream was removed,
leaving the researchers with only the contacts’/alters’ streams to
use as a basis of prediction, predictability dropped to fifty-seven
percent.42 Importantly, the accuracy obtained by using the
contacts’ tweets alone was greater than that obtained by simply
observing the ego’s tweets. Bagrow noted: “Paradoxically, this
indicated that there is potentially more information about the
ego within the total set of alters than within the ego itself.” 43
The study’s authors thus found that “meaningful predictive
information about individuals is encoded in their social ties.” 44
The researchers declared, “there is so much social information
that an entity with access to all social media data” will have only
slightly less predictive ability when having access to a person’s
Twitter contacts than with access to both those contacts and the
user herself.45 The investigators explicitly warned that their
work “may have distinct implications for privacy” because “if an
individual forgoes using a social media platform or deletes their
account, yet their social ties remain, then that platform owner
potentially still possesses 95.1±3.36% of the achievable
predictive accuracy of the future activities of that individual.”46

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Hutson, supra note 3.
Id.
Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 123. Hutson, supra note 3.
Hutson, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 124.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 125.
Id.
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Bagrow has sounded the alarm, noting, “[w]hat concerns me
in terms of privacy . . . is that there are so many ways that
[social media] platforms are getting at data that I think people
don’t realize.”47 Joanne Hinds, a psychologist at the University
of Bath in the United Kingdom, has asserted, “[w]e have barely
scratched the surface of what types of information can be
revealed” through contacts.48 The University of Vermont, on its
website, went so far as to state that “privacy on social media is
like second-hand smoke. It’s controlled by the people around
you.”49 Privacy on social media is therefore no longer within the
control of the individual. As Bagrow warned, “[y]ou alone don’t
control your privacy on social media platforms, . . . [y]our friends
have a say too.”50
IV. POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS FOR FOURTH
AMENDMENT PRIVACY PROTECTION AGAINST THE
PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE OF ANTICIPATING A
SOCIAL MEDIA USER’S BEHAVIOR BY MONITORING HER
CONTACTS
A. SUBJECTS OF PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE WILL LIKELY BE
UNABLE TO ARGUE FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY FOR
COMMUNICATIONS WITH FRIENDS SINCE THE SUPREME COURT
HAS REPEATEDLY REFUSED TO PROTECT DISCLOSURES MADE BY
FRIENDS
People seeking Fourth Amendment protection from
predictive surveillance online must first overcome a profound
stumbling block—the fact that they have undermined their own
privacy by involving themselves in social media in the first place.
Katz, the “lodestar” guiding the Court’s perception of privacy,51
held, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”52 There is a sense, however, that what one confides
to a friend should be kept secret. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of
friendship is the ability to unburden oneself to a friend, knowing
47. Hutson, supra note 3.
48. Id.
49. Brown, supra note 9.
50. Id.
51. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
52. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citing Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
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that any indiscretion discussed is safely sealed within the
bounds of that private relationship.
The Court does not share this view of friendship. It has ruled
that the act of sharing information, even with one’s friend,
destroys the privacy of the shared secret.53 The Court considered
the privacy among old acquaintances in On Lee v. United States,
a case in which Chin Poy, a former employee, visited On Lee’s
laundry for a chat.54 Unaware that Chin Poy, armed with a
microphone, was operating as an undercover agent for the
Narcotics Bureau, On Lee made incriminating statements.55
When these admissions were later offered against him, On Lee
argued that they must be suppressed as obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.56 The Court disagreed, finding no
Fourth Amendment violation because On Lee “was talking
confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted, and he was
overheard.”57 Chin Poy’s use of technology, here a radio
transmitter to broadcast On Lee’s statements, made privacy
among co-criminals no less of a “spurious libert[y].” 58 Thus,
government use of technology did not provoke Fourth
Amendment protection from a false friend.59
The Court again denied protection for statements
improvidently shared with colleagues in Hoffa v. United States.60
In Hoffa, Teamsters Union President Jimmy Hoffa openly spoke
of bribing jurors in front of Ed Partin, a union official who Hoffa
had invited into his hotel room, the hotel lobby, and the

53. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753–54 (1952) (holding no
Fourth Amendment violation when agent Lee overheard Petitioner talking
“confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted,” even though agent Lee
overheard with the help of a transmitter and receiver).
54. Id. at 749.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 750.
57. Id. at 753–54.
58. Id. at 754.
59. See id. at 754 (refusing to treat the use of transmitter and radio as
wiretapping and, ultimately, finding no Fourth Amendment violation). See also
id. (“The use of bifocals, field glasses or the telescope to magnify the object of a
witness’ vision is not a forbidden search or seizure, even if they focus without
his knowledge or consent upon what one supposes to be private indiscretions.”).
60. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding no Fourth
Amendment violation because Petitioner “was not relying on the security of the
hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not
reveal his wrongdoing”).
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courthouse.61 When Partin later testified at Hoffa’s juror
tampering trial as to what he heard while undercover,62 Hoffa
claimed such evidence was gathered in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.63 In considering Hoffa’s contention, the Court
waxed philosophical: “The risk of being . . . betrayed by an
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one
deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It
is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”64
The Court further noted: “Partin was in the suite by invitation,
and every conversation which he heard was either directed to
him or knowingly carried on in his presence.”65 Since Hoffa had
therefore simply formed a “misplaced belief” that his hearer
would not reveal his wrongdoing, he had “no interest
legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment” in the case.66
The Court, once again, refused Fourth Amendment
protection to statements made to a government informant in
United States v. White.67 In White, Harvey Jackson met with the
suspect and broadcast their conversations to government agents
by radio.68 One meeting between Jackson and White occurred in
White’s residence.69 Sharing confidences, even in one’s own
home, did not persuade the Court to find a reasonable
expectation of privacy in these communications because,
“however strongly a defendant may trust an apparent
colleague,” such beliefs “are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a
government agent regularly communicating with the
authorities.”70 White declared that anyone considering an illegal
act “must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting

61. Id. at 295–96. See also id. at 296 n.3 (“Hoffa explained [to Partin] ‘that
they was going to get to one juror or try to get to a few scattered jurors and take
their chances.’”).
62. Id. at 296 n.3.
63. Id. at 300.
64. Id. at 303 (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
65. Id. at 302.
66. Id.
67. United States v. White 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
68. Id. at 746–47.
69. Id. at 747.
70. Id. at 749.

148

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 21:1

to the police.”71 If the would-be wrongdoer “has no doubts, or
allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.”72
The guidance that On Lee, Hoffa, and White offer to those
who use social media is not entirely clear. In one sense, Twitter
and Facebook users are in a weaker position than the defendants
in the false friends cases. Whether seen as friends,
acquaintances, or criminal colleagues, the suspects in On Lee,
Hoffa, and White shared information with another person
believing that any confidence would remain private. In contrast,
those on social media are purposely posting information for
others—whether friends or the general public—to consume. If
the Court would not extend Fourth Amendment protection to
incriminating statements uttered face-to-face behind the closed
doors of the home, it certainly will not safeguard
communications broadcast on the Internet.
However, predictive surveillance might result in an
intrusion beyond that suffered in On Lee, Hoffa, and White
because it collects information on future communications based
on previous contacts.73 Social media users would not have the
option of avoiding further privacy invasion by simply ending a
conversation or refusing a friend her next entry into the home.74
Even if a Twitter or Facebook user blocks or un-friends someone,
or chooses to leave the social media platform entirely, the
government could employ predictive surveillance to collect
information foretelling the user’s future behavior.75
Further, language in White could offer a new tack to take in
these cases. The White Court noted that the Court of Appeals in
its case had “understood Katz to render inadmissible against
White the agents’ testimony concerning conversations that
Jackson broadcast to them.”76 Rejecting the Court of Appeals’
reasoning, the Court refused to equate the surveillance in Katz
to that of White because, “Katz involved no revelation to the
71. Id. at 752.
72. Id.
73. See Bagrow, Liu & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 125 (“As few as 8–9 of an
individual’s contacts are sufficient to obtain predictability compared with that
of the individual alone.”).
74. See id. at 122 (arguing that the model presented can accurately “profile”
individuals based solely off previous contacts, without any current data on the
person).
75. See id. at 123 (presenting data showing “[r]epeated, accurate
predictions of a future words . . . ”).
76. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
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Government by a party to conversations with the defendant.”77
White rejected the contention that anyone had a reasonable
privacy expectation that “a person with whom he is conversing
will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police.”78
With the advent of predictive surveillance, a social media user’s
contacts, of course, do indeed make “revelations” to the police
about the user’s future behavior simply by responding to the
user’s posts. The revelations, however, are made without the
intention presupposed by the White Court. Chin Poy, Ed Partin,
and Harvey Jackson deliberately collected their respective
conversations, intending to directly relay them to the
government. No such intentional collection would exist in the
case of predictive surveillance.79 One might need to reasonably
assume the risk that the person to which one shares a confidence
might choose, for her own reasons, to purposely share this
information with the police.80 However, a social media user
might not reasonably be expected to weigh the risk that her
contacts’ usual interactions on social media would leave a
mathematical trace that the government could use to divine
future conduct.
The potential persuasiveness of such reasoning is open to
question. Ultimately, anyone seeking Fourth Amendment
protection against predictive surveillance of social media would
come up against decades of precedent in which the Court has
consistently held that confidences to friends and acquaintances
are not protected.81 In the past, government technology
sophisticated enough to foil a suspect’s calculations in assuming
risk, such as wearing a wire, did not change the Court’s
rulings.82 Thus, those using social media will likely receive no
protection from On Lee, Hoffa, and White.

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952) (describing Chin
Poy as an “undercover agent” for the Bureau of Narcotics); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 296 (1966) (noting Ed Partin was a police informant); see
also White, 401 U.S. at 746–47 (referring to Harvey Jackson as a “government
informant”).
80. See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 303 (affirming that people assume the risk that
their close confidants might become a police informant).
81. The Court decided On Lee in 1952 and White in 1971. On Lee, 343 U.S.
747; White, 401 U.S. 745.
82. See On Lee, 343 U.S. at 754 (discussing how Chin Poy and the Bureau
of Narcotics used a transmitter and receiver to listen to On Lee’s conversations);
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B. A FORMER USER OF SOCIAL MEDIA CLAIMING FOURTH
AMENDMENT PRIVACY AGAINST GOVERNMENT EXPLOITATION OF
HER CONTACTS COULD RESURRECT “TARGET” STANDING AS
PARTICULARLY APT FOR PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE
Persons wishing to contest predictive surveillance will have
to contend with the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent
regarding “standing.”83 Standing is the doctrine that states, “a
person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in
the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional
search.”84 At first blush, the Court’s “standing” stance would
undermine any claim of Fourth Amendment protection against
predictive surveillance. In the seminal standing case, Rakas v.
Illinois, the Court unequivocally ruled that the “capacity to
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment” depended on
“whether the person who claims the protection of the
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place.”85 Arguing that one has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in posts on social media seems doomed at the outset.
However, as with many matters, the devil is in the details.
In Rakas, the defendants were passengers in an automobile
in which police found “a box of rifle shells in the glove
compartment, which had been locked, and a sawed-off rifle
under the front passenger seat.”86 Even though the defendants
conceded they did not own the car, rifle, or shells, they moved to
suppress this evidence as recovered in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.87 The prosecutor responded that the defendants
lacked standing to complain about a Fourth Amendment
violation.88 Noting that each application of the exclusionary rule
blocked relevant evidence from court and therefore exacted a
“substantial social cost,” Rakas deemed Fourth Amendment
White, 401 U.S. at 746–47 (describing how Jackson used a radio transmitter so
the police could listen to White’s conversations).
83. See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979) (holding that Fourth
Amendment rights cannot be vicariously asserted); Byrd v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018) (differentiating Fourth Amendment “standing” from
Article III standing).
84. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1530.
85. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
86. Id. at 130.
87. See id. (outlining the defendant’s arguments in favor of a motion to
suppress).
88. See id. at 131 (outlining the prosecutor’s response to defendant’s motion
to suppress).
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rights as “personal rights” which could “not be vicariously
asserted.”89 Therefore, vindication of Fourth Amendment rights
was left to “defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated.”90
Determining the precise identity of those suffering a Fourth
Amendment violation caused the Court to question “whether it
serves any useful analytical purpose” to consider standing as a
concept “distinct from the merits of a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment claim.”91 In answer, Rakas ruled that standing,
rather than being some “theoretically separate” inquiry, was
simply the substantive Fourth Amendment question of “whether
the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude
the evidence obtained during it.”92 Thus, when a person is
contesting a search, the proper “standing” analysis applies
Katz’s test: “whether the person who claims the protection of the
[Fourth] Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the invaded place.”93 Since the defendants in Rakas “made no
showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in
the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which
they were merely passengers,” their Fourth Amendment claims
failed.94
In using Katz to assess standing, Rakas explicitly rejected a
“target” test offered by the defendants.95 Target standing would
enable “any criminal defendant at whom a search was ‘directed’”
to contest the legality of the search because she was the “victim”
of the police intrusion.96 Rakas found target standing
89. Id. at 133–34, 137.
90. Id. at 134.
91. Id. at 138.
92. Id. at 140; see also id. at 139 (declaring that standing should instead be
“more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine”). Cf.
Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018) (softening the court’s prior
rejection of “standing” as a doctrine separate from the substantive Fourth
Amendment inquiry and noting that Rakas urged that “standing” should not be
viewed as “distinct” from the Fourth Amendment “merits” of a case); Byrd, 138
S. Ct. at 1530 (conceding that, “[t]he concept of standing in Fourth Amendment
cases can be a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have
a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking
relief for an unconstitutional search . . . .”).
93. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1979).
94. Id. at 148.
95. Id. at 132–134.
96. Id. at 132.
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problematic because it would disregard the personal nature of
Fourth Amendment rights by allowing “a defendant to assert
that a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party”
supported suppression of evidence.97
There is perhaps one context in which Rakas’s concerns
about target standing would not exist—predictive surveillance.
Target standing’s failure in enabling a person to assert someone
else’s Fourth Amendment rights to exclude evidence would not
occur with predictive surveillance.98 Were police to view the
online posts of a person’s contacts in order to predict that user’s
future conduct, the officers would not be violating the reasonable
expectations of privacy of the contacts because no privacy
expectations would exist in such public behavior.99 The
“targeted” user therefore would not be relying on the “search” of
her contacts as third parties. Instead, the user would be claiming
that law enforcement was gathering information about her own
future conduct, even in circumstances where she had opted out
of any social media entirely. Unlike prior defendants that have
attempted to employ target standing, the only Fourth
Amendment right a social media user subjected to predictive
surveillance would be vindicating would be her own.
Target standing in predictive search cases would not only
avoid the concerns raised in Rakas, but also provide the simplest
theory to directly address the “programmatic purpose” behind
law enforcement’s predictive policing.100 While Whren v. United
States refused to consider an officer’s subjective motivations
relevant to a Fourth Amendment inquiry,101 later decisions have
examined subjective intent in the context of an agency’s
“programmatic purpose” in the “general scheme” of its
institutional behavior.102 In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the

97. Id. at 133.
98. Id. at 132–134.
99. Id. at 148. See also Brian Mund, Social Media Searches and the
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 19 YALE J. L. & TECH. 238, 241–247 (2017)
(arguing there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in social media posts
because of the third-party doctrine and voluntary sharing).
100. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000) (noting
that absent individualized suspicion, courts would look into programmatic
purposes to determine the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions).
101. The Whren Court noted, “[W]e have been unwilling to entertain Fourth
Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers.”
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
102. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45–46.
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Court found that a drug checkpoint program, operated without
“reasonable suspicion or probable cause,”103 violated the Fourth
Amendment.104 This was in spite of the fact that the Court had
upheld suspicionless checkpoint programs in the past.105 The
fatal flaw in Indianapolis’ checkpoint program was its
“programmatic purpose,” which was “the discovery and
interdiction of illegal narcotics.”106 Since the city’s aim was “to
uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” performing
these checkpoint stops without any Fourth Amendment
individualized suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment.107 If a
law enforcement agency collects information on a user’s contacts
in order to predict that user’s future behavior, it would be fair to
say that the programmatic purpose of this intrusion “targets”
the individual user rather than the contacts. This
characterization is the most apt and clear description of police
actions in predictive surveillance and therefore the most likely
to inform the Fourth Amendment inquiry.
Target standing, when applied to predictive surveillance,
would also effectively answer the two issues Rakas mandated
that standing address: “first, whether the proponent of a
particular legal right has alleged an ‘injury in fact,’ and, second,
‘whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and
interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights
of third parties.’”108 As to Rakas’ first inquiry, with predictive
surveillance, the person who genuinely suffers an “injury in fact”
is the target of the mathematical algorithms anticipating her
behavior, not the users still posting messages online.109 The user
who has retreated from all social media suffers direct injury from
predictive surveillance because she is still being pursued by
police, regardless of her every effort to regain privacy. As to
Rakas’ second question, the victim of predictive surveillance
rightly identifies the right implicated as her “own” because it is
her private future that law enforcement is probing. Predictive

103. Id. at 35.
104. Id. at 48.
105. See id. at 34 (noting that the Supreme Court had held that “brief,
suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purposes of combating
drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants were constitutional”).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 42.
108. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1979).
109. Id.
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surveillance’s fulfillment of Rakas’s own two criteria for
answering the key questions for standing provides still further
evidence for employing target standing in this unique context.
C. A REINTERPRETATION OF COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING A
HOMEOWNER’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY, WHEN VIEWED WITH COURT
RULINGS ON COLLECTION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, COULD
PROVIDE THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION AGAINST PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA
Any law enforcement agency using predictive surveillance
would likely argue that, rather than intruding directly on the
communications of the targeted individual, the government is
merely collecting the current messages of each person who had
previously communicated with the target.110 As noted in the last
section, the Court currently has little patience for those
complaining about government intrusions on persons other than
themselves.111 Another potential path to Fourth Amendment
protection could be established by considering three cases
spanning half a century: Alderman v. United States,112 Riley v.
California,113 and Carpenter v. United States.114
In Alderman, the Court protected an individual against
government intrusion on communications even though the
person himself was not a participant in those conversations.115
After appellate courts affirmed the convictions for “conspiring to

110. See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Government Access to and
Manipulation of Social Media: Legal and Policy Changes, 61 HOWARD L. J. 523,
547 (2018) (discussing the case of United States v. Meregildo in which the court
held police using a target’s online friends to survey communications was not
violation of the Fourth Amendment). See also Christopher Raleigh Bousquet,
Why Police Should Monitor Social Media to Prevent Crime, WIRED (Apr. 20,
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/why-police-should-monitor-social-mediato-prevent-crime/ (arguing for increased police use of social media monitoring
to predict crime and discussing the legal ramifications of doing so).
111. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132–134 (rejecting “target” standing which
would allow someone to assert another’s Fourth amendment rights).
112. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
113. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
114. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
115. See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 176 ( holding that defendant was entitled to
Fourth Amendment protections “if the United States unlawfully overheard
conversations of a petitioner himself or conversations occurring on his premises,
whether or not he was present or participated in those conversations”).
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transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce,”116 the
Court learned that the United States, potentially in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, “had engaged in electronic
surveillance”117 of Alderisio’s business premises in Chicago.118
Alderman framed the issues as follows:
What standards are to be applied in determining whether each
petitioner has standing to object to the use against him of the
information obtained from the electronic surveillance of petitioner
Alderisio’s place of business? More specifically, does petitioner
Alderisio have standing to object to the use of any or all information
obtained from such electronic surveillance whether or not he was
present on the premises or party to a particular overheard
conversation?119

The Court therefore considered whether a person has
standing to contest government intrusions into conversations in
which he is not a party. Alderman reaffirmed “the general rule
that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights”120 which
could “not be vicariously asserted.”121 The Court further
reiterated, “suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment
violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights
were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved
solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.”122
After explicitly restating the personal nature of Fourth
Amendment rights, Alderman declared that a violation would
occur “if the United States unlawfully overheard conversations
of a petitioner himself or conversations occurring on his
premises, whether or not he was present or participated in those
conversations.”123 The Court defended its ruling from dissenting
Justices Harlan and Stewart, who objected “to our protecting the
homeowner against the use of third-party conversations
overheard on his premises.”124 The Court rejected the dissent’s
116. Id. at 167.
117. Id.
118. See id. (“[P]etitioners alleged they had recently discovered that
Alderisio’s place of business in Chicago had been the subject of electronic
surveillance by the Government.”). See also United States v. Alderisio, 424 F.2d
20 at 21 n.2 (specifying that the government electronically monitored “the
Gaylur Mercantile Company and the First National Mortgage Company”).
119. Alderman 394 U.S. at n.2.
120. Id. at 174.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 171–72.
123. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
124. Id.
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position that “unless the conversational privacy of the
homeowner himself is invaded, there is no basis in the Fourth
Amendment for excluding third-party conversations overheard
on his premises.”125 Alderman noted that if the government had
illegally seized “tangible property belonging to third parties—
even a transcript of a third-party conversation”126 the
homeowner would be able to contest the search simply because
the evidence was the fruit of “an unauthorized search of his
house, which is itself expressly protected by the Fourth
Amendment.”127 The Court warned that the dissent would allow
officers to enter a “house without consent and without a warrant,
install a listening device, and use any overheard third-party
conversations against the owner in a criminal case, in spite of
the obvious violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be secure
in his own dwelling.”128 Alderman rejected this approach, noting,
The rights of the owner of the premises are as clearly invaded when
the police enter and install a listening device in his house as they are
when the entry is made to undertake a warrantless search for tangible
property; and the prosecution as surely employs the fruits of an illegal
search of the home when it offers overheard third-party conversations
as it does when it introduces tangible evidence belonging not to the
homeowner, but to others.129

Therefore, Alderman explicitly established that, in certain
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment protected “third party
conversations” even if the persons seeking privacy were not
themselves involved in the overheard conversations.130 The
rationale supporting the protection, however, was based on the
privacy rights of the homeowner.131 Kyllo v. United States, a case
involving government use of technology to intrude into a house,
noted the special status of the home in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.132 Kyllo noted that, when it came to privacy, the
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 177.
128. Id. at 178.
129. Id. at 179–80 (emphasis added).
130. See id. at 180 (“[C]onversations as well as property are excludable from
the criminal trial when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal invasion of
the home.”).
131. See id. at 179 (“We adhere to the established view in this Court that the
right to be secure in one’s house against unauthorized intrusion is not limited
to protection against a policeman viewing or seizing tangible property . . . .”).
132. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“‘At the very core’ of
the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
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“Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the
house.’”133 This was because “[i]n the home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe
from prying government eyes.”134
While persons subject to predictive surveillance of their
Twitter contacts may send some of their tweets from home, they
cannot rely on the privacy of their premises as did Alderisio in
the Alderman case. Such Twitter users send their messages to
the Internet, a domain outside of the physical home. The Court,
however, has recently determined, in Riley v. California, that
some information in the digital realm has a privacy interest
comparable to that in the home.135 Riley involved officers looking
through cellphones obtained from two arrestees.136 In Riley’s
first case, police, after arresting David Riley for “possession of
concealed and loaded firearms,”137 located photographs on his
phone showing Riley standing in front of a car suspected of being
connected with an earlier shooting.138 In the second case, police
caught Brima Wurie apparently selling drugs.139 A search of
Wurie’s “flip phone” ultimately led to police seizing drugs and
guns from an address found on the phone.140 When the police in
both cases justified their collection of cellphone evidence as
obtained by search incident to arrest, the Court refused to
extend this search warrant exception to digital information.141

and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”) (quoting
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). Kyllo involved
government “use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a
public street to detect relative amounts of heat within.” Id. at 29.
133. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
134. Id. at 37.
135. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014) (“[A] cell phone
search would typically expose to the government far more than the most
exhaustive search of a house . . . .”).
136. Id. at 378–79, 380.
137. Id. at 378.
138. See id. at 379 (explaining that while “there was ‘a lot of stuff’ on the
phone, particular files . . . ‘caught [the detective’s] eye . . . ’”).
139. See id. at 380 (“[A] police officer performing routine surveillance
observed respondent Brima Wurie make an apparent drug sale from a car.”).
140. See id. at 381 (specifying that police “found and seized 215 grams of
crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and
cash”).
141. See id. at 386 (holding that the general exception to the warrant
requirement for searches incident to arrest did not extend to data on cell
phones).
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In assessing searches of smartphones incident to arrest,
Riley drew a distinct line between “physical objects,” such as a
package of cigarettes,142 and the “digital content on cell
phones.”143 A search of a cellphone gave the government access
to such “vast quantities of personal information” that it bore
“little resemblance” to traditional searches of physical items. 144
Riley declared that equating searches of physical objects and
cellphones “is like saying a ride on horseback is materially
indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of
getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping
them together.”145 The Court therefore put digital information
stored on devices such as smartphones in an entirely separate
“category” with protections “far beyond” such physical items as
“a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”146 In doing so, Riley
equated the privacy interest in a smartphone with that in the
home:
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more
than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains
in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it
also contains a broad array of private information never found in a
home in any form—unless the phone is.147

The digital information stored in a smartphone was
therefore of such a great capacity and sensitivity that the Court
found it rivaled or exceeded the privacy interests in the home—
the Fourth Amendment’s “core.”148
The digital information on a cellphone shares many
similarities with the digital information found in social media
accounts online. Riley noted that smartphones “could just as
easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars,
tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or
142. Id. at 383–386.
143. Id. at 386.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 393.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 396–97.
148. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). The court has
asserted, “‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.’” Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
Further, the Justices have recognized that a search of the home implicates one
of the “core areas of privacy.” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 405 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7
(1977)).

2020]

THE INDISCRETION OF FRIENDS

159

newspapers.”149 Social media fulfills many of these same
functions. Facebook, by allowing the sharing of photos and
videos, fulfills the functions of cameras, videos players, and tape
recorders. Instead of a Rolodex and a calendar, Facebook has a
“friends” list and an “events” feature. Facebook’s timeline and
Instagram’s profile and stories are analogous to diaries. Finally,
these services have newsfeeds, which users share and over
which they debate. Indeed, the main difference between social
media and the collection of devices Riley listed in smartphones
is that social media combines and amplifies these various
functions to create a more immersive, perhaps even addictive,
experience.150 Using these services therefore might cause us to
expose more of ourselves than we ever would in a mere calendar
or Rolodex.
Further, Riley declared that cellphones “are now such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important
feature of human anatomy.”151 To say that social media is
pervasive would be an understatement; Twitter has recently
reported having “126 million daily active users” while Facebook
has logged in at “1.2 billion daily users.”152 For perspective, the
number of Twitter users exceeds the population of Mexico in
2018 (estimated at over 125 million for July 2020) 153 and the
number of Facebook users is well over three times the population
of the United States in 2018 (estimated at over 327 million for
July 1, 2019).154 Further, much of the very pervasiveness and

149. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014).
150. See
Social
Media
Addiction,
ADDICTION
CTR.,
https://www.addictioncenter.com/drugs/social-media-addiction/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2020) (explaining a percentage of users become addicted to social
media).
151. Riley, 573 U.S. at 385. Riley also wondered at the “pervasiveness that
characterizes cell phones,” noting that the person not carrying a cellphone was
the “exception” in our society. Id. at 395.
152. Hamza Shaban, Twitter Reveals Its Daily Active User Numbers for the
First
Time,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
7,
2019,
10:43
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/02/07/twitter-reveals-itsdaily-active-user-numbers-first-time.
153. Cent. Intelligence Agency, Mexico, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Feb. 5,
2020),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/mx.html.
154. U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts: United States, CENSUS.GOV,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218 (last visited Feb.
20, 2020).
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insistency Riley noted about smartphones came from the fact
that they performed a function much like modern social
media.155 Social media is so firmly rooted in our daily lives that
seventy percent of respondents in a Wall Street Journal/NBC
News survey reported that they “check in daily.”156 Therefore, if
Riley worried that an officer’s opening of a cellphone would
permit deep and broad access to many aspects of a person’s life,
no less a concern is presented by government entry into an
individual’s online activity.
Finally, Riley noted that cellphone owners “keep on their
person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from
the mundane to the intimate.”157 The same could be said of the
digital record left by social media users who likewise share the
mundane, such as a plate of food at a restaurant, and the
intimate, whether it be relationship statuses or health updates.
When Riley worried that the “sum of an individual’s private life”
on cellphones could “be reconstructed through a thousand
photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions,” the
Court could have been discussing the timeline of Facebook or the
profile and stories of Instagram.158 This, in a sense, is the very
purpose of Facebook—to construct a version of one’s life. Finally,
Riley was troubled by the fact that “the data on a phone can date
back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier.”159 Similarly,
the data in social media accounts, stored in the Cloud, continue
to exist over the years from one’s first post.160 Moreover, the
predictive surveillance revealed by Bagrow and his peers
presents a danger not even contemplated by Riley—that the
155. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) ( “The term ‘cell phone’
is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices . . . .could just as easily be
called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries,
diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”).
156. John D. McKinnon & Danny Dougherty, Americans Hate Social Media
But Can’t Give It Up, WSJ/NBC News Poll Finds, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2019,
5:30
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/americans-agree-social-media-isdivisive-but-we-keep-using-it-11554456600.
157. Riley, 573 U.S. at 395.
158. Id. at 394.
159. Id.
160. See How Long Does Your Data Remain on the Internet, VTNV SOL.’S
LTD. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.le-vpn.com/long-data-remain-internet/
(explaining that data uploaded to social media “may be searchable forever” and
that data storage in the Cloud means that “in most cases data you upload,
access, store, and use will at some point get used by, stored and saved on some
third party server”).
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government could conceivably obtain information not only about
a person’s past behavior, but her future.161
The argument for social media privacy from predictive
surveillance is strengthened when Alderman and Riley are
combined with Carpenter v. United States, a case involving
government collection of the location information of
cellphones.162 As Carpenter explained, today’s smartphones
“continuously scan” their environment to gain “the best signal,
which generally comes from the closest cell site.”163 Every time
a “phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped
record known as cell-site location information (CSLI).”164 This
process occurs automatically, regardless of whether a person is
using the phone or not.165 In 2011, police in Detroit exploited this
technology to connect Timothy Carpenter to a series of
robberies.166 Armed with a federal court order directing
MetroPCS and Sprint to provide CSLI for Carpenter’s phone, the
government gathered “12,898 location points cataloging
Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day”
for up to 152 days.167 Prosecutors used this evidence to place
Carpenter’s phone “near four of the charged robberies.”168 Since
this evidence demonstrated that Carpenter was “right where
the . . . robbery was at the exact time of the robbery,” it “clinched
the case.”169
The Carpenter Court was clearly uncomfortable with the
power of CSLI, warning, “technology has enhanced the
Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded
from inquisitive eyes.”170 The Court worried about people being
“at the mercy of advancing technology”171 and of a “too
permeating police surveillance.”172 Carpenter therefore aimed to
preserve “that degree of privacy against government that existed
161. See Hutson, supra note 3 (explaining that computer scientists can
predict the content of future postings).
162. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
163. Id. at 2211.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2212.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2213.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2214.
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
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when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”173 The Court
reiterated that the Fourth Amendment was meant “to secure
‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’”174 and recalled
that the founders crafted this right to protect against British
officers committing “unrestrained” searches.175
Carpenter was particularly alarmed by the intrusiveness
and pervasiveness of CSLI technology. Collection of CSLI
enabled the government to easily create an “exhaustive chronicle
of location information” detailing where a person was,176 on
average, every quarter hour for months or years at a time.177
Carpenter emphasized that the “cell phone location information
is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”178 The Court
therefore ruled, “when the Government accessed CSLI from the
wireless carriers, it invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation
of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.”179 Carpenter
held, “[t]he Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records was
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”180
The Court found CSLI was protected by the Fourth
Amendment despite the public nature of the information. A
smartphone user “continuously reveals his location to his
wireless carrier” and therefore shares the whereabouts of his
phone with a third party, the cell service provider.181 Carpenter
acknowledged that earlier precedent, starting with United
States v. Miller,182 had created the “third-party doctrine” which
refused to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information shared with another person or entity.183
Specifically, the Court conceded, “[w]e have previously held that
‘a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information

173. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2213.
176. Id. at 2219.
177. The CSLI information of Carpenter averaged “101 data points per day”
for more than 100 days with one phone service provider. Id. at 2212. The Court
noted that “wireless carriers” maintained records “for up to five years.” Id. at
2218.
178. Id. at 2216.
179. Id. at 2219.
180. Id. at 2220.
181. Id. at 2216.
182. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
183. Carpenter 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
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he voluntarily turns over to third parties.’”184 Therefore, the
defendant in Miller lacked any reasonable expectation of
privacy, and therefore a Fourth Amendment claim, in the
“canceled checks, deposit slips, and monthly statements” the
government sought by subpoena because he had shared such
information with his bank, a third party.185 Similarly, in Smith
v. Maryland,186 when the government used a “pen register” to
collect the numbers a caller dialed in placing a phone call, the
Court found the caller lacked a reasonable privacy expectation
in these dialed numbers.187 The phone caller had squandered his
privacy by voluntarily conveying this information “to a telephone
company.”188
Carpenter found Miller and Smith did not limit a
smartphone user’s privacy in CSLI.189 Even though a
smartphone user’s continuous exposure of “his location to his
wireless carrier” implicated Miller and Smith’s “third-party
principle,” it was not clear to the Court that this doctrine’s “logic
extend[ed] to the qualitatively different category of cell-site
records.”190 Quite simply, CSLI’s “detailed and comprehensive
record” of a phone user’s movements191 dwarfed the information
obtained by the “limited capabilities” of the old-fashioned pen
register.192 Carpenter concluded: “Given the unique nature of cell
phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a
third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth
Amendment protection.”193
Due to the invasiveness of predictive surveillance, the Court
might someday follow Carpenter’s lead, finding Fourth
Amendment protection against this intrusion despite the fact
that social media users have shared information with others.
With both CSLI and platforms such as Facebook and Twitter,
technology has crafted “an intimate window into a person’s life,”
revealing “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)).
Id.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2216–17.
Id. at 2217.
Id. at 2216.
Id. at 2217.
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associations,” and therefore the “privacies of life.”194 While CSLI
provided “an all-encompassing record of the holder’s
whereabouts,” predictive surveillance arguably intrudes even
further by building an all-encompassing record of a person’s
online statements, and therefore, her thoughts.195 While
Carpenter fretted about wireless carriers’ retention of a person’s
movements “every moment of every day for five years,” 196
Twitter and other social media platforms hold records of
personal behavior beyond a mere five years.197 Facebook even
has a legacy option for deceased Facebook users, making the use
of an account last beyond a lifetime.198 Carpenter was alarmed
that CSLI gave the government “easy, cheap, and efficient”
access to a “deep repository” of historical information with “just
a click of a button.”199 These same concerns could exist with
predictive surveillance’s exploitation of social media platforms.
Of particular interest for predictive surveillance issues are
Carpenter’s concerns regarding the time-traveling nature of
CSLI. The Court recognized that CSLI surveillance had a
“retrospective quality” which gave law enforcement access “to a
category of information otherwise unknowable.”200 CSLI enabled
the government to “travel back in time to retrace a person’s
whereabouts.”201 CSLI’s ability to “chronicle a person’s past
movements” forced the Court to “confront” a “new phenomenon,”
a kind of surveillance the government previously “simply could
not” perform.202 CSLI time-travel is based on the fact that

194. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (1948)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2218.
197. Twitter had its tenth “birthday” in 2016. We Look Back at Famous First
Tweets As Twitter Turns 10, BBC NEWSBEAT (Mar. 20, 2016),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/35857514/we-look-back-at-famous-firsttweets-as-twitter-turns-10. Longtime Twitter users are discussed in Charles
Arthur, How Twitter Was Born: The First 140 Users, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 11,
2010), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2010/jan/11/twitter-first140-users-history.
198. Facebook has made a “memorialized account” option for those who have
passed
away.
Memorialized
Accounts,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1506822589577997 (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
Facebook users can appoint a “legacy contact” to look after one’s account. Id.
199. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18.
200. Id. at 2218.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2216–2217 (quotations omitted).
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wireless providers continually log location information “for all of
the 400 million devices in the United States.”203 Police therefore
need not “know in advance whether they want to follow a
particular individual or when.”204 Having the luxury of knowing
that information is being continuously collected, law
enforcement can go back in time whenever it wishes to tail any
individual for “every moment of every day” for a matter of
years.205 With predictive surveillance, social media users would
be subject to the same kind of “tireless and absolute
surveillance.”206 Predictive surveillance, however, could be even
more intrusive than CSLI because this new technology delves
into not only a person’s past but also her future. The Court could
rightly ask how a person could reasonably anticipate the
exposure of her future interactions with others, particularly the
government, when she herself cannot even divine this “otherwise
unknowable” frontier.207
Another reason that Carpenter refused to apply Miller and
Smith’s third-party doctrine to CSLI involved voluntariness.
When Miller did his banking, he chose to share his checks and
deposit slips with the bank.208 When Smith dialed his phone, he
likewise meant to share his phone number with the phone
company.209 Carpenter, when passively possessing his
smartphone, did not similarly commit “voluntary exposure”
because cellphones have become “such a pervasive and insistent
part of daily life” that carrying one is indispensable to
participation in modern society.”210 Unless one committed the
extreme step of “disconnecting the phone from the network,
there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location
data.”211 Carpenter therefore concluded, “in no meaningful sense
does the user voluntarily ‘assume the risk’ of turning over a
203. Id. at 2218.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id. (“Moreover, the retrospective quality of the data here gives
police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable.”).
208. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (finding that Miller
“voluntarily conveyed” his banking information).
209. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (finding that Smith
“voluntarily conveyed numerical information”).
210. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (citations
omitted)
211. Id.
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comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”212 Many
would argue that social media—in keeping users in touch with
friends and loved ones, alerting them to the latest news, offering
the needed escape of a humorous video, and providing birthday
reminders—has become an equally integral part of society that
people are loathe to give up. Carpenter also distinguished
between using a smartphone and voluntarily banking or dialing
on a landline by noting that CSLI information is collected
“without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up.”213 The Court noted that “[v]irtually any activity
on the phone,” including social media updates, generates
CSLI.214 Predictive surveillance exploits this same aspect of
connectivity; even if a user leaves social media and takes no
further volitional action, the government can predict future
behavior by scrutinizing followers—actions of others beyond a
former user’s control. With CSLI, Carpenter warned, “[a]part
from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way
to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data.”215 Former social
media users trying to escape the reach of predictive surveillance
lack even this dire option.
In holding that government CSLI collection was a search,
Carpenter revitalized Fourth Amendment protection in public
places.216 The Court declared, “[a] person does not surrender all
Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public
sphere” because what a person “seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”217 Such language could bode well for social media
users who fear an intrusion from predictive surveillance. As
Carpenter warned, “the Court is obligated—as ‘[s]ubtler and
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the Government’—to ensure that the ‘progress of
science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”218

212. Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
213. Id.
214. See id. (listing other activities including “incoming calls, texts, or
e-mails and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes
when checking for news, weather, or social media updates”).
215. Id.
216. See id. at 2218
217. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)).
218. Id. at 2223 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–74
(1928)).
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V. CONCLUSION
In his advanced years, Cicero, the great Roman orator and
statesman, wrote in his Treatise on Friendship about a friend,
“What can be more delightful than to have some one to whom
you can say everything with the same absolute confidence as to
yourself?”219 Cicero declared, “In the face of a true friend a man
sees as it were a second self.”220 Cicero could not imagine that,
with the advent of advanced mathematics scouring social media,
his statement would take on even greater truth. In the near
future, the government could, when scrutinizing a person’s
contacts on social media, create a second version of that original
user. This statistical construct, from the target’s friends and not
reliant on any information from the targeted individual, could
then predict the target’s future conduct.221
Over half a century ago, government agents in Silverman v.
United States penetrated a house with a “spike mike” to
overhear conversations about illegal gambling.222 Silverman
found this intrusion to violate the Fourth Amendment because
“[a]t the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.”223 The Court refused to allow the government to
“secretly observe or listen” to what occurs in the home without
the protection of a Fourth Amendment warrant.224
Social media, of course, resides not in a person’s home but
in the Cloud. Riley began to grapple with the reality that people
now depend on the privacy of information in the digital realm
much as they do with information in their homes.225 If at the core
of the Fourth Amendment, a person has the right to “retreat into

219. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, LETTERS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO WITH
HIS TREATISES ON FRIENDSHIP AND OLD AGE 15 (E. S. Shuckburg trans. 1909).
220. Id.
221. Such technology could potentially be so powerful that it falsifies the
statement made by the famous science fiction writer, Philip K. Dick, in his short
story, The Minority Report, “there can be no valid knowledge about the future.”
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CLASSIC STORIES BY PHILIP K. DICK 71, 99 (Citadel Press, Kensington
Publishing Group, 1987).
222. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961).
223. Id. at 511.
224. Id. at 511–12; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001)
(reiterating that the area in a home is to be “held safe from prying government
eyes”).
225. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–97 (2014).
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his own home,”226 an individual should likewise have the
equivalent right to “retreat” from social media.227 If instead the
Court in the future allows law enforcement to pursue a person
by predicting her behavior from others’ posts even after she has
“retreated” from social media by deleting her account, then it has
failed to guard against “the seismic shifts in digital
technology.”228 The Court has already explored doctrines that
could provide protection against predictive surveillance of a
social media users’ contacts: target standing, the right of
homeowners in the privacy of any communications on their
premises, and the recognition of the need for privacy in digital
information. Ultimately, privacy in this realm will depend on
whether the Court will value protecting us from the indiscretion
of friends.
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